EVP_KDF-PBKDF2(7ssl)

EVP_KDF-PBKDF27ssl

The pbkdf2 evp_kdf implementation

Overview

Support for computing the PBKDF2 password-based KDF through the EVP_KDF API.

The EVP_KDF-PBKDF2 algorithm implements the PBKDF2 password-based key derivation function, as described in SP800-132; it derives a key from a password using a salt and iteration count.

The output is considered to be a cryptographic key.

Identity

"PBKDF2" is the name for this implementation; it can be used with the EVP_KDF_fetch() function.

Supported parameters

The supported parameters are:

"pass" (OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD) <octet string>
"salt" (OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT) <octet string>
"iter" (OSSL_KDF_PARAM_ITER) <unsigned integer>

This parameter has a default value of 2048.

"properties" (OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES) <UTF8 string>
"digest" (OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST) <UTF8 string>

These parameters work as described in "PARAMETERS" in EVP_KDF(3).

"pkcs5" (OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PKCS5) <integer>

This parameter can be used to enable or disable SP800-132 compliance checks. Setting the mode to 0 enables the compliance checks.

The checks performed are:

- the iteration count is at least 1000.
- the salt length is at least 128 bits.
- the derived key length is at least 112 bits.

The default provider uses a default mode of 1 for backwards compatibility, and the FIPS provider uses a default mode of 0. This option breaks FIPS compliance if it causes the approved "fips-indicator" to return 0.

"fips-indicator" (OSSL_KDF_PARAM_FIPS_APPROVED_INDICATOR) <integer>

This option is used by the OpenSSL FIPS provider.

A getter that returns 1 if the operation is FIPS approved, or 0 otherwise. This may be used after calling EVP_KDF_derive. It returns 0 if "pkcs5" is set to 1 and the derived key length, salt length or iteration count test fails.

Notes

A typical application of this algorithm is to derive keying material for an encryption algorithm from a password in the "pass", a salt in "salt", and an iteration count.

Increasing the "iter" parameter slows down the algorithm which makes it harder for an attacker to perform a brute force attack using a large number of candidate passwords.

No assumption is made regarding the given password; it is simply treated as a byte sequence.

Releases

3 releases since Debian 12 (Bookworm); the text changed 2 times.

  1. 12
  2. 13
  3. Arch

Conforming to

SP800-132

History

This functionality was added in OpenSSL 3.0.

From openssl 3.6.5-1 in Arch Linux 2026-11-01. Parsed by carta from the page's man source.